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IN 1990, Abe Masao first published his now famous seminal essay, “Kenotic God 
and Dynamic Emptiness,” in John B. Cobb, Jr. and Christopher Ives, The Emptying 
God: A Buddhist-Jewish-Christian Conversation (Maryknoll, N. Y.: Orbis Books). 
Abe introduced a dialogical methodology into the relatively new field of compara­
tive theology: he not only presented a Buddhist notion o f emptiness as Ultimate 
Reality, he developed that notion in dialogue with Christian theology. Abe thereby 
entered the Christian theological conversation concerning the nature of God and 
God’s relationship to creation. With The Divine Matrix: Creativity as Link between 
East and West, Joseph A. Bracken, S. J., is now returning the favor. Following a 
similar methodology, Bracken presents a notion of creativity in process theology 
that he then uses to enter into philosophical/theological conversations with Hindu­
ism, Buddhism and Taoism. In so doing, Bracken joins Abe as a pioneer in explor­
ing common structures of intelligibility—with both their similarities and 
differences—through critical reflection and interfaith dialogue.
In pursuing this project. Bracken utilizes two of Alfred North Whitehead’s philo­
sophical concepts. First is the notion of creativity as a metaphysical category by 
which one can intellectually mediate Infinity with the constitution of determinate 
entities -  even including God’s trinitarian personhood. Second is Whitehead’s con­
cept of the “extensive continuum” which provides a relational matrix for the exis­
tence and activity of all entities. In Part One of his book, Bracken develops these 
ideas as interpretive tools to understand Infinity, God and world. Bracken builds his 
interpretive structure step by step through engaging the ideas of Aristotle, Aquinas, 
Eckhart, Schelling, Heidegger and, of course, Whitehead himself. Then in Part Two 
of the book, Bracken uses the structure of intelligibility he has carefully crafted 
from the Western tradition in order to explore how similar structures are at work in 
the philosophical and theological traditions of Vedanta, Mahayana Buddhism and 
classical Taoism.
In Chapter 1, Bracken points out that Aristotle sought “to explain motion in terms
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of a series of ‘movers’ rather than the series of movers in terms of an underlying 
motion or process common to them all.” Bracken examines Aristotle’s view, and 
then offers an alternative view where motion is seen as not coming ultimately from 
particular entities but from an immanent principle of activity within all entities 
themselves-a principle that has as much metaphysical status as matter or form. In 
Chapter 2, Bracken examines Aquinas’ theology in order to provide more theolog­
ical content to this immanent principle of action. Bracken critically engages 
Aquinas in developing his view that the fundamental activity of existence is the 
very act of existing itself which is the underlying nature o f God expressed both in 
the three divine persons and in creation. One problem with Bracken’s project—a 
problem with much of process theology in general—is that he defines activity in 
terms of potentiality and actuality in such a way that if God’s activity is God’s 
nature, then God’s omnipotence and omniscience are called into question.
In Chapter 3, Bracken explores the activity of being as the ground of divine and 
human subjectivity. Based on a certain interpretation of Eckhart, Bracken posits 
this divine grounding activity as accounting for mystical union with God, thus 
avoiding the problem of an identity of two substantial entities that are different in 
kind. However, Eckhart’s problem is how to distinguish the Son of God from 
humans if both derive from the same divine activity. Turning to Friedrich Schelling, 
Bracken—in my mind—faces another problem, namely, where Schelling states that 
God’s personhood is realized through creation. This goes against the Augustinian 
doctrine that God’s personhood is established in the Trinity itself. Also by turning 
finally to Heidegger’s later work on the question of being, Bracken shows how it is 
possible to disengage the grounding activity of being from God as a Supreme 
Being. Bracken’s attempt to weave an intellectual model of being as act in terms of 
subjectivity from these Western ideas shows the difficulty of affirming God’s 
divine identity in the face of reductionist factors in human experience. But in the 
end, the point that Bracken succeeds in making is that the Godhead is an activity 
that, as the nature of God, both grounds God’s personhood and human subjectivity.
By the time Bracken reaches Chapter 4, one can see clearly that the theological 
project of this book is not just descriptive but constructive. In Part One of the book, 
he is building a case for his own type of process theology. In Chapter 4, the final 
chapter of Part One, Bracken turns directly to Whitehead in order to present the cat­
egories that are foundational for the structure of intelligibility Bracken is construct­
ing. These categories are “creativity” and the “extensive continuum.” Bracken 
blends these Whiteheadean concepts within a trinitarian theology in a way that sup­
ports the notion of a “divine matrix” which, Bracken argues, provides a structure of 
intelligibility that can be used to understand Ultimate Reality in Christianity and 
other world religions. For Bracken, creativity is a divine metaphysical activity that 
only exists in actual entities as their ontological ground and vital source of exis­
tence. It is the ground of the life of the divine being and of the universe. God is not
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identified with creativity, but gives it its decisive pattern within the Trinity and the 
universe. This pattern, or relational matrix of God’s creative activity, is understood 
as the extensive continuum-a creative continuum that grounds all divine or created 
entities. Bracken concludes this chapter by presenting a fascinating sketch of the 
communitarian nature of the inner-trinitarian life based on his matrix model, and 
relates it to the issues of Infinity, God, creation and subjectivity raised in his previ­
ous study of Aristotle, Aquinas, Eckhart, Schelling and Heidegger. I highly recom­
mend this section as well as the concluding section of the book where Bracken takes 
up this topic again with great insight and clarity.
In Part Two o f the book, Bracken explores how his matrix structure of intelligi­
bility based on Whiteheadean concepts of creativity and the extensive continuum 
can be used to understand the notions of Infinity in Eastern philosophy and theolo­
gy. In Chapter 5, Bracken explores Vedanta’s philosophy of Atman-Brahman by 
looking at six o f the Great Sayings from the Upanishads. Bracken proposes that 
Brahman can be interpreted as the pure act of being and consciousness, and that 
Atman can be interpreted as the ultimate subject of this act. One feels that in these 
interpretations, Bracken has contributed a possible reading of the Upanishads-one 
that certainly conflicts with Shankara’s view, but may fit better with Ramanuja’s 
position. For Shankara, change and therefore activity is a characteristic of maya, not 
of reality. In the rope-snake metaphor, the rope (reality) that is mistaken for a snake 
(illusion) does not change into a snake nor does it move at all. All such movement 
is attributed to the snake which is an illusion. On the other hand, Ramanuja uses the 
metaphor o f milk and curds: milk (reality) truly does change into curds (selves and 
the world). Change is real, and the fluidity of the milk represents the dynamic and 
creative nature of Brahman. Unfortunately, Bracken does not mention this meta­
phor, but uses another that compares Brahman to the soul and the world to the body 
of God, which works against the very point that Bracken seeks to make. Finally, it 
is perhaps valuable to note that there is another system of Indian philosophy that 
does hold that Ultimate Reality is unceasing activity. Mimamsa argues that activity 
as process and force is Ultimate Reality, and that all we experience are forms con­
stituted by that activity.
In Chapter 6, Bracken looks at the Mahayana doctrine o f dependent origination. 
To be sure, dependent origination is a process of interdependence that does not exist 
apart from the forms that make up its matrix of dependent arising. Here we find a 
Buddhist correlate to Bracken’s creative continuum that is the very activity of exis­
tence forming as beings. Also in both cases, we are looking at a pure activity that is 
prior to the experience of subjectivity and the objective world, and therefore pro­
vides a dynamic matrix of unity for self and world. Bracken wisely examines 
Nishida Kitaro’s philosophy concerning this unifying power at the ground of 
thought and phenomena. Nishida calls this ultimate reality “absolute nothingness” 
because it is neither a relative thing nor no-thing, but is the absolute “place” of rel-
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ative existence and non-existence. Further, to be absolute it must also empty itself 
of any duality, of any separation from the entities of the world. Thus, absolute noth­
ingness is absolute self-negation, a fully kenotic reality as Abe Masao makes clear 
in his own work following Nishida in the Kyoto School. Bracken mentions my own 
critique of this position where it views the kenosis of God in creation as defining 
Godself as totally self-emptying—thus emptying out God’s transcendence as 
Trinity. Fortunately, Bracken also constructs his own position in a way that also 
avoids this problem.
Finally, Chapter 7 takes up the notion of the Tao in the classical philosophies of 
Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu. Here, Bracken examines the early Taoist texts that posit 
the spontaneous creativity of the Tao. In so doing, he mentions the metaphor of run­
ning water and notes that it implies a primordial activity that produces “crystallized 
forms of one and the same underlying activity.” Since Bracken mentions the well- 
known metaphor o f the golden lion for Buddhist emptiness, if he had also men­
tioned Ramanuja’s milk-curds metaphor, all three comparative links would have 
been connected by similar metaphors. On the other hand, the one problem that 
Bracken has with the Taoist position is with their claim that the Tao existed prior to 
creation (heaven and earth). This position contradicts Bracken’s view that the pure 
activity of being cannot exist except in its instantiations. Bracken goes so far as to 
refer in this regard to Chuang Tzu’s “apparent confusion” about temporal and logi­
cal priority. But, Taoism uses the Chinese character kung to refer to the Tao. Kung, 
meaning “void,” is constructed with strokes indicating a cave with a roof over it. It 
implies that the Tao is a special emptiness out of which comes the world. Therefore, 
it seems that Bracken’s claim that the Tao is pure activity only captures part of what 
Taoists are saying about the Tao. For example, Chang Chung-yuan, whom Bracken 
quotes, refers to the “constant Tao” as “the all-changing changeless.” Chang is here 
claiming that while there is change in the dynamic Tao, it takes place within the 
stillness of the ultimate mystery o f the Tao that in turn accounts for the profound 
nature o f all changing things.
Here we see the same methodological limitation that can be found in Abe 
Masao’s work mentioned earlier. Namely, by exploring another religious tradition 
through a lens or logic that provides a structure of intelligibility in one’s own tradi­
tion, there is always the danger of filtering out something of value in that other tra­
dition. On the other hand in his conclusion, Bracken admits this limitation but also 
implies—and I would agree with him—that this very limitation becomes a basis for 
further discussion that will advance the common search for a more adequate philo­
sophical structure o f intelligibility. Comparative philosophical theology does not go 
ahead from just one side of the dialogue, but requires the collaboration of all tradi­
tions involved in the conversation. This possibility for shared interfaith reflection is 
what makes this new field so exciting and promising. Bracken’s voice in the con­




In his conclusion, Bracken states that his intent in this book has been to focus on 
the ways in which religious traditions have made intelligible the relationship 
between the Infinite and the finite, as well as how the Infinite has been revealed in 
and through the finite. He then addresses a number of counterarguements from tra­
ditional Christian theology where the nature of God is fully actual and determinate, 
as well as from the Eastern traditions he had explored in the previous three chapters. 
As he argues for his theistic trinitarian process model, it becomes clear that Bracken 
sees this model as having—like any intellectual model—certain strengths and weak­
nesses for wrestling with vexing philosophical and theological questions concerning 
Ultimate Reality and the world of our experience. Bracken’s book is an outstanding 
contribution to fostering comparative theological reflection and conversation about 
this central issue of religious thought East and West. It certainly deserves to be read 
and discussed widely by scholars from all religious traditions who are interested in 
comparing the presuppositions we use in trying to understand Ultimate Reality and 
its relationship with our world.
BUDDHIST WOMEN ACROSS CULTURES: Realizations. Edited by 
Karma Lekshe Tsomo. State University of New York Press, 1999. pp. viii + 
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SHOBHA r a n i d a s h  
Karma Lekshe Tsomo began her activities with and for Buddhist women through 
Sakyadhita (“Daughters of the Buddha”), an international association of Buddhist 
women founded in 1987. As a result of her efforts, this anthology is now in our 
hands. Each o f the fifteen contributors reflects on women and Buddhism in doctri­
nal, philosophical or social terms.
The essays are divided into two sections: Buddhist Women in Asian Traditions 
and Contemporary Buddhist Women. The first part, as the title indicates, deals with 
Buddhist women in India, Sri Lanka, China, Japan and Tibet. The essays in the sec­
ond part are varied, including a biography of Aung San Suu Kyi, a comparison of 
Christian and Buddhist women, Buddhist women in the West, and the question of 
conception and the entry of consciousness.
The introductory chapter starts with the legacy of Mahaprajapati Gautami, the 
founder of the order of nuns (bhiksuni sahgha). Her story is well-known, but Karma 
Lekshe Tsomo retells it with many provocative suggestions. Especially noteworthy 
is Karma Lekshe Tsomo’s effort to date the history of women in Buddhism prior to 
the Buddha’s Enlightenment. She presents some interesting theories about the
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